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CASE COMMENT 
 
THE ARCTIC SUNRISE 
 
1. Background to the arbitral proceedings 
This case concerns measures taken by the Russian Federation against the Arctic 
Sunrise, a vessel chartered and operated by Greenpeace International and flying the 
flag of the Netherlands. The vessel has been used in a number of environmental 
protest actions around the world. Most recently, it was involved in direct action 
protests against drilling for oil by the Prirazlomnaya rig in Russian waters.  This was 
part of a larger campaign by Greenpeace against oil drilling in the Arctic.   
 
The incident has attracted a lot of public attention, largely as a result the media 
campaign run by Greenpeace calling for the release of the so-called ‘Arctic 30’.1  
With the release of the crew in December 2013, public attention waned but the 
legal proceedings initiated by the Netherlands continued. The arbitral award on the 
merits of the dispute was issued in August 2015 and it addresses a number of 
interesting legal questions.  
 
The incident that led to the arbitration took place on 18-19 September 2013. The 
Prirazlomnaya rig was to become one of the first ice-resistant platforms to be used 
for commercial oil drilling operations in Arctic waters. The Arctic Sunrise had 
travelled to the Pechora Sea with a view to protesting against the drilling. The Arctic 
Sunrise itself remained outside of the 500-metre safety zone which had been 
established around the platform, but it launched several small rigid hull inflatable 
boats (RHIBs) which approached the platform. The activists on board the RHIBs had 
intended to scale the platform and establish a camp in a survival capsule strapped 
to the side of the rig. The action was primarily aimed at bringing attention to the 
risks of drilling for oil in the Arctic but the activists had also made clear that they 
wished to bring operations on-board the platform to a halt for a short period, if 
possible.  A statement issued prior to the action stated that ‘a number of activists 
are determined to stay on in the capsule until such time as Gazprom promises to 
abandon its plans to drill for oil at Prirazlomnaya, or publishes its oil spill response 
plan in full and explains in a credible way how such drilling can be done without 
creating an unacceptable threat to the environment.’2 
 
The campaigners had announced their plans in advance and they were met at the 
platform by the Russian coastguard vessel Ladoga.  Russian officials, also in RHIBs, 
attempted to prevent the campaigners from scaling the platform.  Two activists 
succeeded in attaching themselves to the platform but they were subsequently 
removed and detained by Russian officials. These two campaigners were taken 
directly back to the Ladoga. At this stage, the Greenpeace RHIBs decided to return 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See e.g. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/arctic-
impacts/Peace-Dove/Arctic-30/ <accessed 3 November 2015>. 
2 Arctic Sunrise, Award on the Merits of 14 August 2015, para. 84. Available at: 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/21 <accessed 3 November 2015>. Hereafter, ‘Award’. 
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to the Arctic Sunrise, which was waiting outside of the safety zone. They were 
pursued by the remaining Russian RHIBs.  The precise facts that followed were key 
to the arbitration and they will be addressed in more detail below.  Ultimately, the 
Arctic Sunrise was boarded the following day by Russian law enforcement officers 
descending from a helicopter. The ship and crew were arrested and taken to port in 
Murmansk.  Initially, the crew were charged with piracy under the Russian Criminal 
Code, but these charges were later amended to hooliganism.  The Master of the 
Arctic Sunrise was also charged with an additional administrative offence of failing to 
comply with the demands of an officer of the security agency of the state.  The 
Arctic Sunrise was also seized.  
 
As the flag state, the Netherlands protested against the arrest of the vessel, which it 
claimed was contrary to international law.  Arbitral proceedings were commenced 
on 4 October 2013 on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). The Netherlands also applied to the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for provisional measures. ITLOS issued a provisional 
measures order on 22 November 2013 in which it called upon Russia to 
‘immediately release the vessel Arctic Sunrise and all persons who have been 
detained, upon the posting of a bond or other financial security by the Netherlands’ 
and to ‘ensure that the vessel Arctic Sunrise and all persons who have been 
detained are allowed to leave the territory and maritime areas under the Russian 
Federation.’3 Compliance with this order also became a question for the arbitral 
tribunal. 
 
The Russian Federation neither participated in the provisional measures 
proceedings before ITLOS, nor did it participate in the arbitral proceedings. As a 
result, it was necessary for the Netherlands to request the President of ITLOS to 
appoint the majority of the members of the Tribunal in accordance with Article 3 of 
Annex VII of the UNCLOS.  The Tribunal was thus composed of Prof. A.H.A Soons 
(appointed by the Netherlands), Dr A. Szekely, Mr H. Burmeister, Prof. J. Symonides 
and Judge T. Mensah.  Judge Mensah was designated as the President of the 
Tribunal.   
 
The Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction in a decision delivered on 26 November 
20144 and it issued its award on the merits on 14 August 2015.5 This short comment 
is principally concerned with the manner in which the Tribunal approached the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Prompt Release), Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Case No. 22, para. 
105. 
4 Arctic Sunrise, Award on Jurisdiction of 26 November 2014. Available at: 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/21 <accessed 3 November 2015>. The Award on Jurisdiction 
largely concerned whether or not Russia’s Declaration made upon ratification of UNCLOS excluded this 
type of dispute from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Declaration, as 
interpreted in light of UNCLOS, did not exclude its jurisdiction. For comment, see A. Oude Elferink, 
‘The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-Faceted Law of the Sea Case with a Human Rights Dimension’ 
(2014) 29 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 244-289. 
5 Supra (n2). 
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legality of the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise by the Russian authorities. It will also deal 
with the question of compliance with the provisional measures order.   
 
2. Nature of the Claims 
Before turning to the merits of the claims, one of the first questions addressed by 
the Tribunal concerned the standing of the Netherlands to bring the claims. It was 
uncontested that the Arctic Sunrise was flying the flag of the Netherlands at the time 
of its arrest and therefore, in accordance with established principles of international 
law, the Netherlands was permitted to advance claims not only on behalf of the ship 
and its owners, but also the crew and other people on board who were ‘involved in’ 
or ‘interested in’ the vessel’s operation.6 According to the Tribunal, ‘all thirty 
individuals on board the Arctic Sunrise at the relevant times were “involved” or 
“interested” in the ship’s operations.’7 This is an important decision, because not all 
30 individuals on board were considered to be crew members, but they were still 
considered to be involved in or interested in the operation of the vessel, 
demonstrating a broad understanding of this concept.  
 
Although the claims were being brought by the Netherlands on behalf of the Arctic 
Sunrise and all of those individuals on board the vessel, the Tribunal nevertheless 
considered them to be ‘direct claims’ of the Netherlands.8 This follows the reasoning 
of the ITLOS in cases such as M/V Saiga (No.2) or M/V Virginia G when it held that it 
was necessary to take into account whether the provisions invoked by the claimant 
state conferred rights on states or on ships and persons.9  In this respect, the 
Tribunal is clear that the provisions invoked by the Netherlands, namely Articles 
56(2), 58, 87 and 92 of UNCLOS, all constituted ‘provisions owed to States under 
the Convention.’10  This decision has a number of consequences. Firstly, it means 
that the exhaustion of local remedies rule in UNCLOS does not apply.11 Secondly, it 
may have implications for other litigation arising from this incident, a point that we 
will be returned to below.   
 
3. The Legality of the Arrest 
The Tribunal started its analysis of the legality of the arrest by noting that the Arctic 
Sunrise had been involved in a protest action and ‘protest at sea is an internationally 
lawful use of the sea related to the freedom of navigation.’12 At the same time, it 
recognized that ‘the right to protest is not without its limitations and when the 
protest occurs at sea its limitations are defined, inter alia, by the law of the sea.’13 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Award, para. 171, drawing upon previous jurisprudence of ITLOS. See M/V Saiga (No. 2), Judgment 
of 1 July 1999, ITLOS Case No. 2, para. 106; M/V Virginia G, Judgment of 14 April 2014, ITLOS Case 
No. 19, para. 127. 
7 Award, para. 171. 
8 Award, para. 173. 
9 See M/V Virginia G (n6) para. 156; M/V Saiga (No. 2) (n6) para. 98. 
10 Award, para. 168. 
11 Award, para. 173.  
12 Award, para. 227. 
13 Award, para. 228. 
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The key question faced by the Tribunal was therefore whether the Russian 
authorities had the authority to arrest the vessel under international law.  This 
involved complex questions of law and fact.  The task of the Tribunal was not 
facilitated by the failure of Russia to participate in the arbitral proceedings.  These 
difficulties had already been explicitly addressed by ITLOS in the provisional 
measures proceedings when it said that ‘the Russian Federation could have 
facilitated the task of the Tribunal by furnishing it with fuller information on 
questions of fact or law.’14 The Arbitral Tribunal also noted that ‘Russia’s non-
participation in the proceedings had made the Tribunal’s task more challenging than 
usual [and] in particular, it has deprived the Tribunal of the benefit of Russia’s views 
on the factual issues before it and on the legal arguments advanced by the 
Netherlands.’15  Indeed, as will be seen below, the failure of Russia to appear could 
arguably have had some consequences for the findings of the Tribunal relating to 
key facts underpinning the decision.  
 
The first potential legal basis for the arrest considered by the Tribunal related to 
piracy. As noted above, the original charges laid by the Russian authorities explicitly 
identified the acts as piracy, even though these were later amended because the 
Russian authorities themselves did not believe that this allegation was supported by 
the facts.16 As a matter of international law, piracy is defined as ‘any illegal acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depridation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed … against 
a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.’17 
Direct protest actions against by organisations such as Greenpeace or Sea Shepherd 
have been held by some national courts to amount to piracy.18 However, the critical 
fact in the present case was ‘the Prirazlomnaya is not a ship’ and therefore the acts 
did not fall within the definition of piracy.19  For this reason, the Tribunal did not 
have to consider the more controversial element of the definition of piracy, namely 
whether direct protest actions by groups such as Greenpeace can be considered to 
be acts of violence committed for private ends.   
 
The second potential legal basis for the arrest considered by the Tribunal related to 
the jurisdiction of a coastal state over offshore platforms.  Under UNCLOS, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ITLOS Order (n3) para. 54. Some individual judges were even more explicit, see e.g. Declaration of 
Judge ad hoc Anderson, para. 2: ‘While the position of the Netherlands was made clear, the stance of 
the Russian Federation had to be taken from its diplomatic communications, legislation and the 
decisions of courts in the Russian Federation.  Unfortunately, these materials were both incomplete and 
in places inconsistent, making the task of the Tribunal more difficult. Thus, the decision of the Russian 
Federation not to appear in this case is to be regretted. Non-appearance does not serve the efficient 
application of Part XV of the Convention or, more widely, the rule of law in international relations.’ 
15 Award, para. 19. 
16 Award, para. 238. 
17 UNCLOS, Article 101(a)(ii) 
18 See most recently Institute of Cetacean Research v Sea Shepherd Conservation Organization, United 
States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, Order (amended) of 24 May 2013. See also Castle John 
and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v NV Mabeco and NV Parfin, Belgian Court of Cassation, Judgment of 
19 December 1986. 
19 Award, para. 238. 
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coastal state has the power to regulate activities on board platforms as well as in 
safety zones around such platforms.20 As noted above, the Russian authorities had 
established a 500 nautical mile safety zone around the platform, in which ships were 
prohibited from navigating without the permission of the coastal state.21 This basis 
of jurisdiction offered a more convincing basis for the assessment of the arrest, 
compared to the piracy provisions of UNCLOS. 
 
As the Arctic Sunrise had never entered the safety zone itself, the arrest had to be 
based upon the notion of constructive presence. This doctrine refers to the situation 
when ‘a foreign ship outside the territorial waters sends boats into territorial waters 
which commit offences there, the mother ship renders herself liable to seizure by 
reason of these vicarious operations.’22 On this basis, the RHIBs and the Arctic 
Sunrise could be treated as acting together, so that the Arctic Sunrise was deemed 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal state. Yet, the actual arrest of the 
vessel did not take place when the RHIBs were still in the safety zone, but only after 
the Arctic Sunrise and the RHIBs had left the area.  The Tribunal therefore had to 
determine whether the conditions of hot pursuit under Article 111 of UNCLOS had 
been satisfied. Previous tribunals have held that the conditions in Article 111 are 
cumulative and they must all be satisfied by a state carrying out an arrest.23 It follows 
that the interpretation of these conditions became a key issue, as they define the 
boundary between legitimate exercise of coastal state jurisdiction and unlawful 
interference with freedom of navigation.  
 
The first condition addressed by the Tribunal was whether the pursuing vessels had 
given the appropriate signal at the commencement of the pursuit.  In this regard, 
UNCLOS requires that ‘the pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or 
auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen to 
heard by the foreign ship.’24 On a strict interpretation of this provision, a radio signal 
given at a distance may not be sufficient.  Indeed, the interpretation of this 
condition explicitly arose during the drafting of a previous version of this provision, 
when the International Law Commission noted that ‘signals given at a great distance 
and transmitted by wireless’ would not count for the purposes of signaling the 
commencement of a pursuit.25 Thus, the International Law Commission anticipated 
that the pursuing vessel must make some kind of other signal to the pursued vessel, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 UNCLOS, Articles 56 and 60. On coastal state jurisdiction in safety zones, see S. tho Pesch, ‘Coastal 
State Jurisdiction around Installations: Safety Zones in the Law of the Sea’ (2015) IJCML 512-532; J. 
Harrison, ‘Safeguards against Excessive Enforcement Measures in the Exclusive Economic Zone’, in H. 
Ringbom (ed), Jurisdiction over Ships: Post-UNCLOS Developments in the Law of the Sea (Brill/Nijhoff, 
2015) 244-226. 
21 The fact of whether a safety zone had been established was contested by the Netherlands but the 
Tribunal appears to accept that the Russian authorities had validly done so; Award, paras 248-249. 
22 Lord McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. 1 (1956, Cambridge University Press) 245. As noted by 
Gilmore, there are questions about the extent of the doctrine of constructive presence to cases 
involving a ship acting with other boats, but this does not arise in the present case; W. Gilmore, ‘Hot 
Pursuit’ 
23 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (n6) para. 146. 
24 UNCLOS, Article 111(4). 
25 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea’ (1956 II) YbILC 284-285. 
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such as the use of sirens or lights. It is therefore significant that the Tribunal in the 
present case rejected such a narrow understanding of this condition. Rather they 
preferred an evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS, stating that ‘given the large 
areas that now must be policed by coastal States and the availability of more 
reliable advanced technology (sea-bed sensors, satellite surveillance, over-the-
horizon radar, unmanned aerial vehicles), it would not make sense to limit valid 
orders to stop to those given by an enforcement craft within the proximity required 
for an audio or visual signal that makes no use of radio communication.’26 This 
interpretation is in line with the works of many commentators who have called for ‘a 
flexible interpretation in order to permit the effective exercise of police powers on 
the high seas’27 and it is notable because it is the first time that such a decision has 
been made by an international court or tribunal.28 As a result, the actions of the 
Ladoga, which used VHF radio to contact the Arctic Sunrise, satisfied this condition. 
 
The second condition addressed by the Tribunal was whether the vessels were still 
in the safety zone when the pursuit commenced and the signal to stop was given.  
The Tribunal admitted that the evidence on this point was more difficult to decipher.  
What is interesting is that the Tribunal gives some margin of appreciation to the 
Russian authorities in deciding that the signal was given at the appropriate time. The 
Tribunal notes that Article 111(4) requires a coastal state to satisfy itself ‘by such 
means as may be available’ that the pursued vessel was still in the relevant maritime 
zone and the Tribunal interprets this phrase to mean that ‘the location of the foreign 
ship at the time of the first stop order should not be evaluated with the full benefit 
of hindsight.’29 Thus, the Tribunal continued with its flexible interpretation of the 
conditions attached to the right of hot pursuit in Article 111. 
 
The Tribunal would also appear to take flexible approach to the question of the 
identification of the arresting authorities. On this point, UNCLOS is clear that ‘the 
right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other 
ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorized to that effect.’30 This requirement was clearly satisfied by the Ladoga, 
which was a marked coastguard patrol vessel. However, the Tribunal noted that the 
helicopter that carried out the final arrest was ‘unmarked and the men descending 
from it did not, in the recollection of the crew of the Arctic Sunrise, identify 
themselves.’31 Despite this apparent omission, the Tribunal nevertheless was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Award, para. 260. 
27 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn: Manchester University Press, 1999) 216; 
see also C.H. Allen, Doctrine of Hot Pursuit: A Functional Interpretation Adaptable to Emerging 
Maritime Law Enforcement Technologies and Practices’ (1989) 20 Ocean Development and 
International Law 309-341. 
28 Similar interpretations have been made by domestic courts, however. See W. Gilmore, ‘Hot Pursuit: 
The Case of R v Mills and Others’ (1995) 44 ICLQ 949, 956. 
29 Award, para. 267. 
30 UNCLOS, Article 101(5). 
31 Award, para. 101 – in para. 100 they point out that the only marking on the helicopter was a red star 
on its bottom sign. 
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‘satisfied, in context, that the vessel was boarded by Russian officials.’32 This finding 
again demonstrates a willingness to take a contextual approach to the interpretation 
of the hot pursuit provisions in UNCLOS.  
 
The final condition addressed by the Tribunal was whether the pursuit was 
continuous in accordance with Article 111(1) of UNCLOS.  It is in relation to this 
condition that the actions of the Russian authorities were considered to fall short of 
the hot pursuit requirements in UNCLOS.  In many respects, the initial actions of the 
Russian authorities conformed to what one may expect from a maritime interdiction 
operation.  The captain of the Ladoga first ordered the Arctic Sunrise to stop and 
warning shots were fired at the vessel when the Greenpeace ship failed to comply 
with this instruction.  A boarding operation, using RHIBs, was also attempted, 
although it was not successful. These facts clearly demonstrate the difficulty for 
states in carrying out arrests at sea.  The Ladoga also threatened to open direct fire 
on the Arctic Sunrise and it is clear from the relevant rules of international law that 
such a use of force to stop a vessel may be lawful, provided that the force is 
necessary and reasonable.33 Ultimately, the Ladoga did not carry out its threat.34   
 
Following these failed efforts to arrest the vessel, the Ladoga continued to follow 
the Arctic Sunrise, but it paused in its attempts to actively try and board the vessel. 
During this period, the Ladoga is described by the Tribunal as ‘shadowing’ the 
Arctic Sunrise.35 Indeed, there was no radio communication between the two vessels 
for almost 24 hours until a message was sent to the Arctic Sunrise from the Ladoga 
on the evening of 19 September, once again ordering the vessel to heave to and 
receive an inspection team. It was shortly thereafter that the Russian helicopter 
approached the Arctic sunrise and carried out the arrest.  
 
The situation in this case can be clearly distinguished from other cases in which a 
break in the pursuit has been deemed to undermine the arrest of a vessel. For 
example, in the M/V Saiga (No. 2), the recall of the patrol boat was considered by 
ITLOS to be ‘a clear interruption of [the] pursuit.’36 No such clear interruption 
happened in this case.  Nevertheless, the change of tactics on the part of the 
Russian authorities from the evening of the 18 September until the evening of the 
19 September was deemed to be highly significant by the Tribunal.37 The Tribunal 
concluded that ‘the Ladoga remained in proximity to the Arctic Sunrise not as part 
of an ongoing pursuit, but rather to ensure that the Greenpeace ship did not 
undertake any further actions at the platform and in the expectation of further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid.. 
33 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (n6) para. 155. 
34 The Arctic Sunrise had indicated that there were petroleum stores on board the vessel and it would 
seem that this fact had prevented the Russian authorities from firing on the vessel; see Award, para. 94. 
35 Award, para. 271. 
36 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (n6) para. 147. 
37 Award, para. 271. 
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instructions from a higher authority.’38 In other words, the pursuit was held to be 
interrupted. 
 
This finding of interruption was fatal to the legality of the arrest and it therefore 
requires careful scrutiny.  It is doubtful whether the mere pause in an attempt to 
actively arrest a vessel can alone be classified as an interruption of the pursuit.  Such 
an interpretation would not fit easily with the operational reality of maritime 
enforcement where it may be necessary for a state to take time to consider its tactics 
and call in appropriate support. Yet, there were other contextual factors that were 
taken into account by the Tribunal in reaching its determination and that support its 
conclusion.  In particular, the Tribunal noted the willingness of the Russian 
authorities to receive a RHIB from the Arctic Sunrise to deliver food and clothing to 
the two detained activists.39  It must be admitted that, whatever one thinks about 
the pause in attempts to arrest the Arctic Sunrise, this particular behaviour is more 
difficult to explain in the context of an active maritime interdiction operation.  
 
It is in this last respect that the non-participation of the Russian authorities in the 
proceedings can be considered to be significant.  The finding of the Tribunal 
essentially relates to the motivations of the Russian Federation.  On the facts that 
were available, it was a reasonable interpretation and the Netherlands can be 
considered to have satisfied the burden of proving an interruption through its 
presentation of the evidence. Yet, there may well have been other explanations for 
the actions of the Russian authorities on 18-19 September 2013 that would have 
justified the change in tactics, but which were not apparent from the evidence that 
was before the Tribunal. If Russia was an active party to the arbitration, it could have 
put forward its own explanation of why it decided to pause in its attempts to board 
the Arctic Sunrise and to take on board food and clothing for the two detained 
activists. By failing to participate, Russia lost this opportunity to persuade the 
Tribunal of the motivations for its actions.  
 
It should be noted that the Tribunal considered several other possible bases for the 
arrest, including terrorism and prevention of ecological adverse environmental 
consequences, but none of them were accepted as valid grounds for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a coastal state on the basis of the facts of the case. Indeed, these 
bases were largely speculative, but they were addressed by the Tribunal in pursuit of 
its duty under Article 9 of Annex VII, according to which ‘the arbitral tribunal must 
satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is 
well founded in fact and law.’40   
 
What the Tribunal did not appear do was to consider a possible different 
justification for the arrest of the two activists who were seized whilst trying to scale 
the platform itself.  Given that these two individuals were arrested whilst physically 
on the platform, it would appear that the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Award, para. 272. 
39 Award, para. 95. 
40 See Award, para. 234. 
DRAFT – Not for citation without consent of the author 
rested upon a firmer footing compared to the later arrest of the activists on board 
the Arctic Sunrise.41 Yet, throughout its Award, the Tribunal consistently talks about 
the crew in the collective and the dispositif of the Award expressly states that ‘by 
arresting, detaining, and initiating judicial proceedings against the Arctic 30, the 
Russian Federation breached its obligations owed to the Netherlands.’42 The 
Tribunal could have done more to explain its position in this respect given the 
different circumstances surrounding their arrest.43  
 
4. Failure to comply with provisional measures 
The Tribunal also considered arguments by the Netherlands that Russia had failed to 
comply with the provisional measures order of ITLOS.  ITLOS itself had expressly 
noted that such measures are binding and thus states are under a legal obligation to 
comply.44 The order called for, inter alia, the prompt release of the vessel and the 
crew, subject to the payment of a bank guarantee, which the Netherlands had 
provided on 2 December 2013.  In the arbitral proceedings, the Netherlands argued 
that Russia had failed to comply with these measures in a prompt manner.  
 
There would appear to have been a clear violation in relation to the vessel.  The 
Arctic Sunrise was not released until 6 June 2014 and it was not until 1 August 2014 
that the vessel was finally given clearance to leave port.  In other words, there was a 
delay of almost seven months and the Tribunal concluded that this was a “patent” 
violation of the provisional measures order.45  
 
The situation was less clear in relation to the crew. All 30 individuals were released 
from custody on 29 November 2013, i.e. before the payment of the bank guarantee 
on 2 December 2013. However, they were not allowed to leave the country, as 
expressly required by the ITLOS Order, until 29 December 2013.  According to the 
Tribunal, ‘the 27 day delay did not meet the promptness requirement’ and it 
‘demonstrates insufficient effort on the part of Russia positively to ensure that the 
individuals could leave the country.’46 However, it could be said that the Tribunal is 
perhaps a little too quick in its criticism of Russia in this respect. In the case of an 
obligation to release a vessel or crew as a provisional measure, promptness needs 
to be considered with some care. After all, there is no general obligation under 
UNCLOS to ensure prompt release of vessels and crews in all circumstances, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See para. 92 of the Award.  However, the Tribunal later, somewhat cryptically, questions the status of 
Ms Saarela and Mr Weber; see para. 274. This is another example where the lack of participation by 
the Russian Federation counted against it, as it was not able to fully clarify whether these two 
individuals were in detention. 
42 Award, para. 401(C). 
43 One may also question the reference to the ‘Arctic 30’ in the dispositive, given that this term is 
somewhat value-laden as it was coined by Greenpeace International as part of its media campaign 
calling for the activists to be freed. In order to maintain their impartiality, tribunals must make all 
attempts to present the facts in an unbiased manner.  
44 ITLOS Order (n3) para. 101. 
45 Award, para. 355. 
46 Award, para. 350. 
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only in relation to specified matters.47 As a consequence, states may not have in 
place specific procedures through which they can give effect to more general 
provisional measures orders relating to release.48 In these circumstances, a state may 
have to employ whatever domestic procedures are available and release may take 
more time compared to situations in which release is ordered on the basis of 
specific prompt release powers.  Prompt compliance can thus only be judged taking 
into account the situation of a particular state. At the same time, this finding 
provides another example where the Tribunal had limited facts at its disposal and 
the failure of Russia to participate in the proceedings means that it had not given 
any explanation to the Tribunal for the reasons for any delay. This omission clearly 
counted against the Russian Federation. 
 
5. Reparation 
Having found violations of UNCLOS, the Tribunal turned to the question of 
remedies.  The Tribunal considered that its findings provided sufficient satisfaction 
and it was not necessary for the Russian Federation to issue a separate apology or 
guarantee of non-repetition.49 Nor did the Tribunal believe it was necessary for it to 
order a formal dismissal of the charges against the detained activists, as it agreed 
that all proceedings had already been terminated by Russia.50 The Tribunal did, 
however, order various forms of reparation and compensation in relation to the 
costs incurred by the Netherlands as a result of the unlawful acts of the Russian 
Federation, i.e. the payment of the deposit for the arbitration and the costs incurred 
by issuing the bank guarantee. In addition, the Tribunal ordered compensation for, 
inter alia, damage to the vessel, costs incurred due to the loss of use of the vessel, 
non-material damage to the detained activists for their wrongful arrest and 
detention and the costs they had incurred both during the trial and up until their 
departure from the Russian Federation.51 The award of compensation to the 
individuals in particular raises certain questions about the relationship between the 
arbitration and other related proceedings. 
 
6. Implications for related litigation 
The arbitral proceedings under UNCLOS are not the only international litigation to 
arise in the aftermath of the Arctic Sunrise arrest. It is also reported that several of 
the detained individuals have also commenced proceedings before the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), alleging a violation of their rights under Article 5 and 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.52  This is an example of a 
growing phenomenon of parallel proceedings in international law, where different 
treaty provisions are used for the initiation of different actions based upon the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See UNCLOS, Article 292. See also Articles 73(2) and 226(1)(b). 
48 Indeed, some of the dissenting judges have suggested that prompt release should not be available 
as a provisional measure; see e.g. ITLOS Order (n3) Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 7(b); 
Dissenting Opinion of President Golitsyn, para. 49 
49 Award, para. 380. 
50 Award, para. 387. 
51 The Tribunal reserved all questions of quantum to a further hearing. 
52 See Award, para. 134. 
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set of facts.53 However, the ongoing litigation before the ECHR raises the possibility 
of reparation being duplicated for the same set of events. Whether the applicants 
will have success in that case will in part depend upon how the ECHR interprets 
Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR which provides that ‘the Court shall not deal with any 
application submitted under Article 34 that … is substantially the same as a matter 
that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to 
another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no 
relevant new information.’  It is suggested that, whilst there is strictly speaking no 
res judicata, given that the legal parties and the legal basis of the claim differ 
between the two sets of proceedings.54  In this respect, it is important to remember 
that the Tribunal considered the claims of the Netherlands to be direct claims of the 
flag state.  There is nevertheless a strong argument that the two sets of proceedings 
address ‘substantially the same matter.’55 This is particularly the case in light of the 
fact that the Tribunal has already ordered compensation for the wrongful arrest, 
prosecution and detention of the Greenpeace activists. Moreover, the Netherlands 
had itself partly characterized the claims in the arbitral proceedings as raising human 
rights issues, albeit not under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and not the European Convention on Human Rights, which is another ground of 
similarity.56 In any case, the ECHR must be very careful, at least in respect of 
awarding remedies, that it does not allow doubly recovery.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The award in the Arctic Sunrise arbitration addresses important issues in relation to 
the ability of coastal states to undertake maritime enforcement operations.  Whilst 
the Russian Federation was found to have violated these conditions, it could be said 
to have lost on the basis of a failure to satisfy the technical conditions of hot pursuit, 
rather than as a result of a blatant disregard for UNCLOS and international law.57  
Indeed, the award implicitly upholds the position that coastal states can take 
enforcement action in safety zones that are established in accordance with UNCLOS 
and they are entitled to pursue and arrest vessels that commit offences within those 
zones, provided that they meet the conditions of hot pursuit.  Furthermore, 
although the Russian Federation lost the case, the Tribunal actually adopts an 
evolutionary interpretation of the conditions attached to hot pursuit in Article 111 of 
UNCLOS, which takes into account the modern context of maritime law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Nollkaemper has referred to this as ‘cluster litigation’; A. Nollkaemper, ‘Cluster-Litigation in Cases of 
Transboundary Environmental Harm’ in  M. Faure and S. Ying (eds), China and International 
Environmental Liability: Legal  Remedies for Transboundary Pollution (Edward Elgar 2008) 11-37. 
54 See e.g. W. Dodge, ‘Res Judicata’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law: Online Edition (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
55 For a discussion of this provision, see Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts 
and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2003) 213 ff. 
56 Award, para. 140.   
57 Legal Counsel for Greenpeace has been quoted as saying that ‘governments exist to uphold the rule 
of law, not to act as armed security agents for the oil industry. This kind of behavior is not limited to the 
Russian authorities – across the world, environmental activists are facing serious intimidation from those 
who wish to silence them’; see http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/Russian-
government-broke-international-law-in-Greenpeace-Arctic-30-case---tribunal1/  
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enforcement. The interpretation of the Tribunal would not appear to support the 
view that the conditions of hot pursuit must be interpreted narrowly.58 Rather, the 
Tribunal stresses the importance of taking into account the object and purpose of 
these rules, in accordance with the ordinary rules on treaty interpretation.59 In many 
ways, the legal interpretations of the Tribunal make it easier for coastal states to 
satisfy the conditions of hot pursuit.  Ultimately, the decision against the Russian 
Federation rests upon a particular appreciation of a complex set of facts, in which 
the actions of the Russian coastguard were interpreted as an abandonment of what 
had started as a legitimate pursuit.  This finding highlights the importance of state 
participation in international judicial proceedings, as a means of ensuring that all 
possible arguments and facts are put squarely before the court or tribunal.  In this 
respect, failure to participate was arguably a strategic error of the Russian 
Federation. 
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58 Contrast e.g. Tho Pesch (n20) 530. 
59 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1). 
